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found the Plaintiff-Appellant to have not made a prima 
facie case of breach of contract or breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Defendant-
Appellee. The petition for rehearing is from the Court 
of Appeals affirmance of the lower court for failure to 
plead impossibility of performance at trial. 
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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
WILLIAM J. SEARLES 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DAYNA COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellee, 
Case No. 920285-CA 
follows: 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, ETC. 
Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as 
Rule 7. Pleadings Allows: Form of Motions. 
(a) Pleadings: There shall be a complaint and an 
answer; a reply to counterclaim denominated as such; an 
answer to a crossclaim, if the answer contains a 
crossclaim; a third party complaint, if a person was not 
an original party is summoned under the provisions of 
Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a third party 
complaint is served. No other pleadings shall be 
allowed, except that the Court may order a reply to an 
answer or a third party answer. 
Rule 8. General Rules of Pleadings. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, 
other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted 
when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in 
a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or 
permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided. (Emphasis 
added) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE FOR REHEARING 
The Court of Appeals in its memorandum decision dated 
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November 15, 1993 states that the Plaintiff failed to plead 
impossibility of performance at trial and since the Court will not 
review an issue not "pled" at trial, affirms the Trial Court's 
decision to dismiss Plaintiff's action. (A copy attached hereto as 
addendum exhibit A.) This statement is incorrect because there was 
no requirement for William J. Searles, (hereinafter Searles), to 
"plead" impossibility of performance in the pleadings on file and 
proceedings in the trial Court were terminated prior to the time 
the Plaintiff would have argued impossibility of performance, as is 
hereinafter more fully explained. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT WERE NOT 
STRUCTURED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO REQUIRE THE 
PLAINTIFF TO "PLEAD" IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
PERFORMANCE IN THE PLEADINGS BEFORE OR AT 
TRIAL. 
THE ISSUE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE WAS 
A REBUTTAL ARGUMENT FOR SEARLES TO USE AGAINST 
DAYNA'S THIRD DEFENSE, BUT WHEN THE TRIAL COURT 
GRANTED DAYNA'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY 
DISMISSAL, SEARLES WAS PREVENTED FROM ARGUING 
SAID ISSUE. 
POINT III SEARLES IS ENTITLED TO RECOGNITION OF HIS RIGHT 
TO SEEK AND OBTAIN CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, 
INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN HIS ACTION AGAINST 
DAYNA. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT WERE NOT 
STRUCTURED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO REQUIRE THE 
PLAINTIFF TO "PLEAD" IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
PERFORMANCE IN THE PLEADINGS BEFORE OR AT 
TRIAL. 
The Court of Appeals in its memorandum decision of 
November 15, 1993 states, "On appeal, Plaintiff suggests that he 
POINT I. 
POINT II. 
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was prevented from meeting the quota. Plaintiff, however, failed 
to plead impossibility of performance at trial, and thus we will 
not review this issue for the first time on appeal.fl The Court was 
perceptive in identifying impossibility of performance as an issue 
in the cause of actions Searles brought against Dayna 
Communications, (hereinafter Dayna). However, the issues as framed 
by the pleadings were: a complaint by Searles against Dayna of 
breach of the employment agreement between the parties by Dayna's 
summary termination of Searles' employment as stated in the first 
cause of action and a claim of breach of the covenants of good 
faith and fair dealing by Dayna in its violation of the letter and 
spirit of the agreement between the parties as set forth in 
Searles' second cause of action. (A copy of said complaint is 
attached as addendum exhibit B.) The pertinent part of Dayna's 
defense is contained in its answer, where in its third defense, 
Dayna claims Searles was terminated for material breach of his 
obligations under the agreement and/or for his failure to perform 
his duties in an acceptable manner. (A copy attached hereto as 
addendum exhibit C.) 
Rules 7(a) and 8(d) state as follows: 
Rule 7. Pleadings Allows: Form of Motions. 
(a) Pleadings: There shall be a complaint and an 
answer; a reply to counterclaim denominated as such; an 
answer to crossclaim, if the answer contains a 
crossclaim; a third party complaint, if a person was not 
an original party is summoned under the provisions of 
Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a third party 
complaint is served. No other pleadings shall be 
allowed, except that the Court may order a reply to an 
answer or a third party answer. 
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Rule 8. General Rules of Pleadings 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, 
other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted 
when not denied in the responsive pleadings. Averments 
in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required 
or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided. 
(Emphasis Added). 
The pleadings that framed the issues then were Searles' 
Complaint and Dayna's Answer. Under the rules, nothing more was 
required. A plaintiff has no duty to reply to a defendant's answer 
unless ordered to do so by the Court. Wheat v. Safeways Stores, 
Inc. 146 Mont 105, 404 P.2d 317 (Mont. 1965); Ray v. Davis 254 Or 
155, 458 P.2d 679 (Or. 1969) More specifically in point is City of 
Palmer v. Anderson 603 P.2d 495 (Alaska 1979) in which the Court 
stated in a very similar case, that where the defendant has 
answered a complaint for breach of contract with an affirmative 
defense, i.e., that the plaintiff has failed to perform under the 
contract, the plaintiff had no duty to reply to said answer. 
Therefore, Searles did not have to "plead" impossibility of 
performance to be able to use the issue to rebut Dayna's third 
defense. 
As far as the order of proof is concerned, usually, the 
party who has the affirmative burden of proof is required to 
produce the first evidence on an issue, and at that time should 
produce all his evidence in chief. Then after his adversary has 
produced all his evidence, the former should be confined to 
rebuttal evidence or evidence which tends to answer or explain his 
adversary's evidence. Soliz v. Ammerman 16 Utah 2d 11, 395 P.2d 25 
(Utah 1964) "Rebuttal evidence" is that which tends to refute, or 
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to so modify or explain as to nullify or minimize the effect of the 
opponent's evidence. Board of Ed. of So. Sanpete School District 
v. Barton 617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980). Rebuttal evidence can be 
introduced only after the parties have closed their case in chief 
and is limited to issues placed in conflict by the adverse party. 
Enlow v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 249 Kan 732, 822 P.2d 617 (Kan. 1991). 
In recapitulation of the foregoing points; Searles was 
not required to "plead" the issue of impossibility of performance 
in his complaint because the issue was a rebuttal to the third 
defense stated in Dayna's answer. Presentation of Dayna's evidence 
in support of its third defense was curtailed when the Trial Court 
erroneously terminated the proceedings. It is therefore erroneous 
to say that Searles failed to "plead" impossibility of performance 
at trial. 
POINT II. THE ISSUE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE 
HAS A REBUTTAL ARGUMENT FOR SEARLES TO USE 
AGAINST DAYNA'S THIRD DEFENSE, BUT WHEN THE 
TRIAL COURT GRANTED DAYNA'S MOTION FOR 
INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL, SEARLES WAS PREVENTED 
FROM ARGUING SAID ISSUE. 
As has been stated in the Appellant's Brief, Searles had 
set forth at trial from both Searles testimony, and the testimony 
of Brad Romney, Dayna's Vice President, facts showing that Dayna 
had failed to timely supply the new products to be sold by Searles 
and his subordinates. It showed anticipated sales of new products 
were used to create projections, which projections were used to 
create the quotas that appeared in Daynafs employment agreements. 
This testimony showed that to reasonably increase Dayna7s sales in 
the desired time frame, there would have to have been available the 
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three new products that Dayna anticipated being able to sell at the 
time the products were originally planned to have been available. 
Searles had put on his case in chief in support of his 
complaint and then rested. Dayna, then moved for a "directed 
verdict", which motion was granted by the Court. This resulted in 
Dayna not presenting a case in chief supporting its defense. By 
reason of Dayna not having put on evidence in support of its third 
defense, which claimed the Plaintiff was terminated for material 
breach of his obligations under the employment agreement and/or for 
his failure to perform his duties in an acceptable manner, there 
was no opportunity for Searles to rebut said defense. Searles' 
rebuttal to Dayna's third defense would have been that he did not 
breach his obligations under the contract because such obligations 
were not in fact intended by the parties to be performance 
minimums. His rebuttal would also have included evidence and 
argument that if they were intended to be valid, binding 
obligations, it would have been impossible for him to meet any such 
quota requirements because Dayna failed to bring the products on 
line in a timely manner. With no product to sell or deliver there 
could have been no sales and no revenue therefrom. His evidence 
also would have shown that there was no complaint about his 
performance of his duties and therefore no sustainable allegation 
that he failed to perform his duties in an acceptable manner. The 
evidence before the Court at the end of the Plaintiff's evidence 
showed that there was no complaint about Searles' performance and 
that in fact, no person employed by Dayna at that time, who had any 
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quota requirement to be concerned about, was in fact meeting said 
quota requirement and that the terminations were a part and parcel 
of a general reduction in force made by Dayna in its attempt to 
reduce its overhead because of the revenue crunch caused by Dayna's 
failure to provide the new product on time. 
The facts supporting the Plaintiff's claim of 
impossibility of performance were fully set forth in the evidence 
presented in support of his complaint. The structure of the 
written pleadings was never such that Searles was required to 
"plead" in writing impossibility of performance. 
It is not necessary under the circumstances, for Searles 
to have plead in writing a defense of impossibility of performance 
because the issue was not in this case a defense, but would have 
been a rebuttal to the third defense of Dayna as stated in its 
answer. 
POINT III. SEARLES IS ENTITLED TO RECOGNITION OF HIS 
RIGHT TO SEEK AND OBTAIN CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES, INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN HIS 
ACTION AGAINST DAYNA. 
In a case reported after the filing of the Searles' 
Appellant's Brief, specifically Heslop v. Bank of Utah 839 P.2d 828 
(Utah 1992). The Supreme Court of Utah refers to holdings in the 
cases of Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989); 
Beck v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) and 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989) and states 
that terminated employees who find themselves in a particularly 
vulnerable position once the employee has breached an employment 
agreement, are in a situation where the employer could reasonably 
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foresee that wrongful termination would force said employee to file 
a suit to enforce his or her employment contract and in doing so, 
would foreseeably incur attorney's fees. The Court thereby goes on 
to recognize such an employee's right to avail himself of 
consequential damages including attorney's fees in such a suit. 
Therefore, Searles asks this Court to recognize the law as stated 
in those cases and to affirm Searles' right to the availability of 
consequential damages including attorney's fees involved in 
bringing this suit. Searles raised the question of his entitlement 
of attorney's fees in the second paragraph of Point VII of his 
Appellant's Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Searles filed his complaint against Dayna claiming breach 
of the employment agreement and breach of the duties of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing impliedly contained 
therein. Dayna filed its answer, claiming in pertinent part, as its 
third defense, the claim of breach of contract by the Plaintiff 
and/or that the Plaintiff failed to perform his duties in an 
acceptable manner. With the issues framed in this manner, it then 
became appropriate for Searles to claim impossibility of 
performance in his rebuttal to Dayna's third defense. However, as 
above stated, the proceedings before the Trial Court did not get to 
the stage where Dayna put on any defense that would have then 
allowed Searles to present his rebuttal. Therefore, the finding by 
this Court that Searles "failed to plead impossibility of 
performance at trial" is not accurate. The Trial Court's action 
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was not appropriate and therefore should not be affirmed. For the 
reasons above stated and for the reason* stated in Sparlos' 
Appellant's Brief, this Court should grant Searles the relief 
sought i this appeal including the right to pursue consequential 
damages, including attorney's fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of , 
1993. 
D. Kendall Perkins 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing to Jon E. Waddoups, Attorney for Defendant/Appellee, 50 
South Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 this 
day oi November, 1993. 
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FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF 
00O00 
William J, Searles, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) 
v, ) 
Dayna Communications, Inc., a ) 
Utah corporation, ) 
Defendant and Appellee. ) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
Attorneys: D. Kendall Perkins, Salt Lake City, tor Appellant 
Jon E. Waddoups, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme% 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's grant of defendant's 
motion for involuntary dismissal of plaintiff's cause of action. 
Plaintiff's action was based upon wrongful discharge from 
defendant's employ. 
Plaintiff's employment agreement provides that defendant may 
terminate plaintiff for cause, which includes "a failure by 
[plaintiff] to perform the duties assigned to [him] in an 
acceptable manner.11 One of plaintiff's duties included fulfilling a quota, which plaintiff indisputably failed to meet. 
Therefore, defendant was entitled to discharge plaintiff under 
the employment agreement. 
On appeal, plaintiff suggests that he was prevented from 
meeting the quota. Plaintiff, however, failed to plead 
impossibility of performance at trial, and thus, we will not 
review this issue for the first time on appeal. See State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990). 
NOV 1 5 1993 
APPEALS ftdu/fti* 
t/' MaryT. Noonan 
i Clerk of the Court 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
Case No. 920285-CA 
H L E U 
(November 15, 1993) 
I c J.*I * n 
We therefore affirm the trial court's decision to dismiss 
plaintiff's action. 
j<U*CC JU %?^J 
-*>7s y 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
• — \ s /? 
^ 
S 
Norman H. Jackson,kludge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
920285-CA 
D, KENDALL PERKINS (2566) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
124 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM J. SEARLES, : 
Plaintiff, : COMPLAINT 
vs. : 
DAYNA COMMUNICATIONS, INC,, a : Civil No. 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff for cause of action alleges: 
1 . This c a u s e o f action a r :i s e s f r o in a n a greeraent 
entered into between plaintiff and defendant to be performed in 
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah and the defendant is a 
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of 
Utah with its principal place of business in the County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a written 
employment agreement on t he 1st da,y of October, 1933, a a o p y >;> f 
which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as 
exhibit "A". 
3 • I h <-J & K» i" H e m t" ii 1 |,J r u v t tl e d for i I, H r m o 1* e in p 1 o / men! 
f r o m O c t o b e r 1, 1 9 8 8 u n t i l S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , 1 9 8 9 - Said a g r e e m e n t 
contained a paragraph 10 dealing with termination which set forth 
therein conditions under which the agreement would terminate and 
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which paragraph provided as follows: "This Agreement shall 
terminate automatically at the end of its Term. This Agreement 
shall terminate prior to the end of its Term (i) at the death of 
DS, or (ii) at Daynafs option and upon the giving of ninety (90) 
days written notice of termination to DS, or (iii) "for cause" 
which shall include, but not limited to, conviction of a 
felony, dishonesty, breach of confidentiality, and material breach 
of DS fs obligations, covenants, agreements or warranties 
hereunder, or a failure by DS to perform the duties assigned to 
DS in an acceptable manner. If employment is terminated pursuant 
to this paragraph, all compensation shall cease and no additional 
amounts will be payable to DS by Dayna, or to DS fs heirs, 
executors, administrator or legal representatives, other than 
that portion of any Override which was earned by DS, pursuant to 
the terms hereof, prior to such termination, net of any 
chargeback." 
4. On or about January 31, 1989, plaintiff was given 
notice by defendant of his termination whicn was to be as of the 
end of business on Friday, February 10, 1989. A copy of said 
letter of January 31, 1939 is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" 
5. The letter of January 31, 1939 stated that if the 
employer was called for a reference on his past performance that 
a good reference would be given. 
6. That the proposed attempt at termination by 
defendant was contrary to the provisions of paragraph 10 of the 
employment agreement entered into between the parties. 
2 
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7. After having received a letter from plaintiff's 
counsel, in which it was pointed out that the termination was not 
appropriately done pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 10 of 
the agreement between the parties. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
8. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in 
p a r a g r a p h s 1 t h r o u g h 7 as if herein fully set forth and 
incorporates them by reference. 
9. The defendant's earlier attempts at termination of 
the employment of the plaintiff were improper and not done 
pursuant to the appropriate paragraph of the employment agreement 
between the parties and therefore is not supported by 1 tie facts 
and is in fact not provided for in the agreement between the 
parties in that in any mention of any quotas, there is no 
provision in the agreement m which the employee may be summarily 
terminated for failure to reach quotas and in fact the quota 
requirements do not end until the end of the fourth quarter 
fiscal 1989 which has yet to expire. 
10. At best, this attempt to terminate the employee 
dated January 31, 1989 should start the ninety days notice 
period running and plaintiff should be entitled to all pay due 
him in both salary and commissions or override due during the 
period ending three months after January jl, 1939 which is the 
approximate amount of J) ! I , fJU J • 00 for salary and whatever amount 
is appropriately due for commissions and override, which will 
have to be calculated from information and records in possession 
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of defendant. 
11. In the alternative, the Court should find that the 
employment agreement between the parties has not been properly 
terminated at all and the plaintiff is entitled to the pay he 
would receive from February 10, 1939 until the expiration of the 
employment agreement which is September 30, 1939 to include 
salary and all commissions and overrides due within that period. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgement on his first cause 
of action in the principal amount of $11,000.00 as salary, for 
such other amount as is appropriately due for commissions and 
override, or in the alternative, for his salary due from February 
10, 1989 until the end of the employment agreement, September 30, 
1939, plus such amounts are as appropriately due for a commission 
and override during that period of time and in either case 
plaintiff should be awarded his costs incurred, and in the event 
the Court finds the defendant to resist suit in a manner not in 
good faith, then he should be awarded his attorney's fees as are 
reasonable and provided for by appropriate Utah law, such amounts 
should include appropriate pre-judgement interest, and for such 
other and further relief as the Court deems just when fully 
advised in the premises. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
12. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 7 as if hereinafter fully set forth and 
incorporates them by reference. 
13. Defendant has attempted to terminate plaintiff's 
e m p l o y m e n t c o n t r a r y t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e ag reemen t between 
t h e p a r t i e s . The d e f e n d a n t ' s l a t e r a t t e m p t t o t e r m i n a t e 
P 1 a:I n t if f f s employment fo r c l a imed " c a u s e " c o n s t i t u t e s a b reach 
of t h e i m p l i e d c o v e n a n t s of good f a i t h and f a i r d e a l i n g i m p l i c i t 
i n any a g r e e m e n t and a r e in f a c t a bad f a i t h a t t e m p t t o avo i d 
p a y i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f a m o u n t s he i s e n t i t l e d t o u n d e r t h e 
a g r e e m e n t be tween t h e p a r t i e s and by r e a s o n t h e r e o f , p l a i n t i f f 
s h o u l d r e c e i v e an award of exemplary damages as a re s u f f i c i e n t t o 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y p u n i s h t h e d e f e n d a n t f o r i t s bad f a i t h conduc t 
a f t e r t h e Court h e a r s e v i d e n c e on t h e f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n and 
o t h e r r e l e v a n t f a c t s p e r t a i n i n g t h e r e t o , but in no e v e n t l e s s 
t h a n an amount of $ 7 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
WHEREFORE, p l a i n t i f f , on h i s second c a u s e of a c t i o n , 
award of e x e m p l a r y damages a s a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o 
p u n i s h d e f e n d a n t for i t s b reach of t h e c o v e n a n t s of good f a i t h 
and f a i r d e a l i n g and in f a c t i t s bad f a i t h and d e l i b e r a t e a t t e m p t 
t o d e p r i v e p l a i n t i f f f rom t h e b e n e f i t s due him u n d e r t h e 
e m p l o y m e n t a g r e e m e n t w i t h d e f e n d a n t a f t e r h e a r i n g e v i d e n c e 
t h e r e o n , b u t i n n t l e s s t h a n $ 7 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , f o r a t t o r n e y ' s 
f e e s as a r e a p p r o p r i a t e and as a r e a l l o w e d a t law or i n e q u i t y , 
f o r h i s c o s t s i n c u r r e d h e r e i n and f o r such o t h e r and f u r t h e r 
p e 1 !i e f a 3 1". he C o u r t deems j u s t when f u l l y a d v i s e d i n t h e 
p r e m i s e s . 
> 
DATED t h i s
 y?2^vAday of May, 1990. 
Plaintifffs Address: 
1441 State Street 
San Diego, CA 92101 
D. Kendall Perkins 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
r 
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AREA DIRECTOR AGREEMENT 
THIS AREA DIRECTOR AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") made and entered into 
on the date set out below, by and between WIT J JAM SEARLES ("AD") and DAYNA 
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ("Dayna"), each of whom acknowledges and agrees to 
abide by these covenants. 
RECITALS 
1- Dayna desires to secure the services of AD to promote sales of Dayna 
Products, pursuant to the terms and conditions herein contained. 
2- AD desires to enter into this Agreement in order to receive compensation tor 
efforts to be expended by AD pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Agreement. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions 
herein contained, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto, intending to be legally 
bound, do hereby agree as follows: 
1- Term. 
The term of this Agreement shall begin on October 1,1988 and shall continue to 
September 30,1989, subject to prior termination as hereinafter provided It is the 
intention of the parties that this Agreement shall be reviewed, and a new and similar 
Agreement shall be entered into to cover Dayna's fiscal year 1990, based on performance 
under this Agreement. 
2- Salary. 
The salary to be paid to AD by Dayna shall be Forty-four Thousand and no/100 
Dollars ($44,000) computed on an annual basis, payable on a biweekly basis, pursuant to 
Dayna's usual and customary payroll practices, and subject to termination as hereinafter 
provided. 
3- Commission and Incentive Bonus. 
The Override to be paid to AD for net dollars revenue to Dayna from the 
assigned Territory (see Paragraph 5, Territory) in the first six months of the Term of the 
Agreement shall be one percent (1%) of all net dollars to Dayna as a result of sales to all 
Buyers other than Disributors. Revenue dollars from sales to Distributors in the first six 
months of the Term of the Agreement shall earn Override of six-tenths of one percent 
(0.6%). The Override to be paid to AD in the second six months of the Term of the 
Agreement for all Buyers other than Distributors shall be eight-tenths of one percent 
(0.8%). Revenue dollars from sales to Distributors shall continue to earn Override of six-
tenths of one percent (0.6%). Commission and Override on all Major National Store 
Chains shall be paid at the rate of seventy-five percent (75%) to the Area into which the 
goods are shipped, twenty-five percent (25%) to the Area handling the Corporate offices. 
A- Neither Commission nor Override shall be paid on service revenues, 
spare parts or accessories ordered from Customer Support, or on 
component parts of any Dayna product that may be ordered as a 
result of negotiations conducted by persons employed by Dayna 
other than the AD or Agents under his control. 
B* The Commission and Override shall be paid on net dollars received 
by Dayna, In the event substantial or extraordinary discounts are 
offered in order to obtain a specific contract, the Commission or 
Override rate, if any, may be negotiated by Dayna's Vice President 
of Sales, or other authorized Dayna officer. 
D- Incentive Commission shall be paid for performance in excess of 
Quota (see Paragraph 6, Quota).In the first six months of the Term 
of the Agreement, Quota shall have been met when the Quota for 
First Six Months has been shipped and invoiced by the 
Company .Incentive Commissions shall be paid on all dollars in 
excess of Quota that have been shipped and invoiced during that six 
month period In the second six months of the Term of the 
Agreement, Quota shall have been met when the Annual Quota has 
been shipped and invoiced by the Company, and Incentive 
Commission shall be paid on all dollars in excess of that Quota that 
have been shipped and invoiced during the Fiscal Year. Incentive 
Commission shall consist of two times the Commission Rate. 
F- In order to earn the Override the AD or agents under his control 
must obtain a purchase order against which product may be properly 
shipped and invoiced, and the customer must honor the invoice with 
payment. UNTIL THE PAYMENT IS COMPLETE, THE 
COMMISSION HAS NOT BEEN EARNED. 
Notwithstanding this fact, Dayna may elect to pay the Commission 
in anticipation of payment being completed. In that event, should 
payment not be completed, the AD may be charged back an amount 
equal to the Commission paid. 
G- The Commission shall be paid on the last paycheck of each month, 
for the previous monthly period, (i.e., April's Commission paid on 
last paycheck of May). 
4- Expenses. 
Dayna shall reimburse AD for the reasonable amount of hotel, traveling, 
entertainment and other expenses wholly, exclusively, and necessarily incurred by AD in 
the discharge of AD's duties hereunder, in accordance with the normal practice for such 
reimbursements by Dayna to its other employees. AD shall submit to Dayna 
substantiation of the expenses incurred, as reflected in a credit card statement or other 
documentation, together with a record of (1) the amount of the expenditure, (2) the time, 
place and nature of the expenditure, (3) the business reason for the expenditure and 
expected benefit, (4) the names, positions and other information concerning individuals 
entertained sufficient to establish their business relationship to Dayna, and (5) any and all 
other information specifically required by Dayna, from time to time. The foregoing 
information shall submitted in such form as Dayna may, from time to time, determine. 
Reimbursement of expenses shall be contingent upon the approval of Dayna's Vice 
President of Sales, or other authorized Dayna officer. 
i/) 
5- Territory. 
The AD shall have as his Area of Management the States West of the 
Mississippi River, and the States of Alaska and Hawaii, except for the States of 
Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri. 
The foregoing Territory assignment shall be subject to change at Dayna's 
sole discretion. 
6- Quota. 
The Quota assigned to AD shall be as set forth below for the Term 
of this Agreement: 
Quarter 1, Fiscal 1989 $1,000,000 
Quarter 2, Fiscal 1989 S 1.400.000 
First Six Months Quota $2,400,000 
Quarter 3, Fiscal 1989 $2,600,000 
Quarter 4, Fiscal 1989 S3.800.000 
Annual Quota Fiscal 1989 $8,800,000 
The Quota is to be derived from the assigned Area. 
7- Responsibilities of Area Director. 
The AD shall have the following responsibilities: 
A- To obtain, or direct agents under his control to obtain, orders for 
Dayna Products which can be shipped and invoiced with complete expectation that the 
customer will honor the invoice with payment at prices specified in Dayna's published 
pricing schedules, or pursuant to specific contracts with such customer. 
B- To represent Dayna, its products, personnel and business in a 
manner which Dayna shall prescribe as appropriate for its sales personnel. 
C- To refrain from making any misleading, inaccurate or other 
improper statement, or from giving such indication to any third party relative to Dayna's 
business, products or relationships. 
D- To fulfill the Quota requirements established pursuant to this 
Agreement 
8- Time Devoted by Area Director. 
AD agrees to devote his or her full business time, attention, efforts and 
abilities exclusively to the business of Dayna and to use his or her utmost endeavors to 
promote the interests of Dayna. 
9- < furgebacks. 
In the event of payment of the Commission in advance of receipt by Dayna 
of all monies from the customers on orders covered by such payment, or in the event a 
i 
draw against Commission is outstanding, a "chargeback" in the amount of the 
Commission shall be paid to Dayna by AD should the employment of AD be terminated 
10- Termination. 
This Agreement shall terminate automatically at the end of its Term. This 
Agreement shall terminate prior to the end of its Term (i) at the death of AD, or (ii) at 
Dayna's option and upon the giving of ninety (90) days' written notice of termination to 
AD, or (iii) "for cause" which shall include, but not be limited to, conviction of a felony, 
dishonesty, breach of confidentiality, any material breach of AD's obligations, 
covenants, agreements or warranties hereunder, or a failure by AD to perform the duties 
assigned to AD in an acceptable manner. If employment is terminated pursuant to this 
paragraph, all compensation shall cease and no additional amounts will be payable to AD 
by Dayna, or to AD's heirs, executors, administrators or legal representatives, other than 
that portion of any Commission which was earned by AD, pursuant to the terms hereof, 
prior to such termination, net of any chargeback. 
11- Entire Agreement. 
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties pertaining to the 
subject matter hereof. This Agreement shall be subject to, and construed in accordance 
with, the laws of the State of Utah. This Agreement shall supercede any and all prior 
agreements between the parties. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands this day of 
, 1988. 
AREA DIRECTOR 
William Searles 
DAYNA COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
By: 
James F. Waltz 
Its: VICE PRESIDENT, SALES 
n. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Patricia M. Leith, Bar No. 1932 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM J. SEARLES, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ANSWER 
VS. ) 
) Civil No. 900902787CN 
DAYNA COMMUNICATIONS, INC., ) 
a Utah corporation, ) Honorable Michael Murphy 
Defendant. ) 
The defendant Dayna Communications, Inc. answers the 
complaint as follows. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim 
against the defendant upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The defendant admits, denies, and otherwise responds to 
the allegations contained in the plaintiff s complaint as 
follows. 
1. In response to paragraph 1 of the plaintiff s 
complaint, the defendant admits that it is a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah; that 
it has its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah; 
l ^ r .t-'l ***> 
and that it entered into an agreement with plaintiff that was to 
be performed in Salt Lake County, Utah, and elsewhere; but denies 
the remaining allegations in paragraph 1 of the complaint. 
2. In response to paragraph 2 of the plaintiff s 
complaint, the defendant admits that it entered into a written 
employment agreement, a copy of which is attached to the 
complaint as Exhibit A, but denies the remaining allegations in 
paragraph 2 of the complaint. 
3. The defendant admits the terms that are contained 
in the agreement attached to the complaint as Exhibit A, but 
denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the 
complaint. 
4. The defendant admits that on or about January 31, 
1989, it gave the plaintiff the memorandum dated January 31, 1989 
that is attached to the complaint as Exhibit B, but denies the 
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the complaint. 
5. The defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph 5 of plaintiff s complaint. 
6. The defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph 6 of plaintiff s complaint. 
7. The defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph 7 of plaintiff s complaint. 
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8. In response to paragraph 8 of the complaint, the 
defendant repeats and incorporates by reference each and every 
response set forth in paragraphs 1 through 7 above. 
9. The defendant denies each and every allegation 
contained in paragraph 9 of the complaint. 
10. The defendant denies each and every allegation 
contained in paragraph 10 of the complaint. 
11. The defendant denies each and every allegation 
contained in paragraph 11 of the complaint. 
12. In response to paragraph 12 of the complaint, the 
defendant repeats and incorporates r>y reference each and every 
response set forth in paragraphs 1 through 7 above. 
13. The defendant denies each and every allegation 
contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint. 
14. The defendant denies each and every allegation not 
specifically admitted in this answer. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The plaintiff was terminated for a material breach of 
his obligations under the agreement and/or for his failure to 
perform his duties in an acceptable manner. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
The defendant has paid all sums due and owing to the 
plaintiff. 
-3-
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FIFTH DEFENSE 
The plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages. 
WHEREFORE, the defendant demands that plaintiff's 
complaint be dismissed with prejudice, that plaintiff take 
nothing thereby, and that defendant be awarded its costs of 
action together with such other relief as the Court deems proper. 
DATED this / day of June, 1990. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Patricia M. Leith 
Attorneys for 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Answer to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
t h l s
 / day of June, 1990, to the following: 
D. Kendall Perkins, Esq. 
124 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah- 84102 
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